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Abstract
A derangement of a graph G = (V,E) is an injective function f : V → V
such that for all v ∈ V , f(v) 6= v and (v, f(v)) ∈ E. Not all graphs admit a
derangement and previous results have characterized graphs with derangements
using neighborhood conditions for subsets of V . We establish an alternative
criterion for the existence of derangements on a graph. We analyze strict Nash
equilibria of the biologically motivated Territorial Raider Game, a multi-player
competition for resources in a spatially structured population based on animal
raiding and defending behavior. We find that a graph G admits a derangement
if and only if there is a strict Nash equilibrium of the Territorial Raider game
on G.
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1. Introduction
A set derangement is a permutation of a set’s elements with no fixed points
[9]. Similarly, a graph derangement is a permutation of the vertices of a graph
which has no fixed points, with additional limitations imposed by the structure
of the graph. More formally, a graph derangement is an injective function map-
ping all vertices of a graph to adjacent vertices [6]. While derangements exist
for all sets containing more than one element, the existence of a derangement
of a graph depends on its structure [9].
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Tutte (1953) introduced the idea of the Q-factor of an unoriented graph
[11]. A Q-factor is a spanning subgraph which consists of 1-regular components
(vertex pairs), and 2-regular components (cycles). A graph will have a Q-factor
if and only if that graph has a derangement [6].
A finite graph G with vertex set V admits a derangement, or equivalently,
has a Q-factor, if and only if, for any finite subset W ⊆ V , |N(W )| ≥ |W |,
where N(W ) is the set of all vertices adjacent to a vertex in W [6, 11].
In this paper, we provide a new criterion for the existence of graph derange-
ments. We adapt the Territorial Raider game (see for example [2, 3, 4, 5]) and
establish a one-to-one correspondence between a derangement of a graph and a
strict Nash equilibrium of the Territorial Raider game. This will prove that a
simple, finite, undirected, connected graph G admits a derangement if and only
if a Territorial Raider game played on G has a strict Nash equilibrium. This
game theoretical approach allows graphs to be analyzed through the implemen-
tation of multi-agent machine-learning algorithms such as Exp3 [1] which can
potentially determine Nash equilibria, and thus the existence of derangements
[10].
2. Notation and preliminaries
In this paper, any graph referred to is assumed to be simple, finite, undi-
rected, and connected.
Definition 2.1. Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A derangement of G is an injective
function f : V → V such that for all v ∈ V , f(v) 6= v and (v, f(v)) ∈ E.
The Territorial Raider game is played on a graph G = (V,E). Every vertex
v ∈ V is occupied by a player Iv and the vertex v is called the home vertex of
Iv. All vertices contain one unit of resources. All players must simultaneously
choose whether to raid a neighboring vertex or stay home to defend against
potential raiders. The object of the game is to maximize the resources obtained.
We are interested in determining the strict Nash equilibria, which are sets
of the strategies of all players such that any player will reduce their payoff by
unilaterally changing their strategy [7]. We note that strict Nash equilibria
must consist of pure strategies, see for example [7, 8]. Consequently, we will
only consider pure strategies.
Formally, a strategy for player Iv is a choice of a vertex w ∈ V such that
w = v or (v, w) ∈ E. An admissible function of G is a function f : V → V
such that for all v ∈ V , f(v) = v or (v, f(v)) ∈ E. We can see that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between strategy sets for the players and admissible
functions of G. We will use f−1 to denote the inverse of f when f is bijective,
and the preimage of f otherwise.
When all individuals move according to their strategy, they receive payoffs
based on their position as well as the positions of their opponents. By staying
home, a player guarantees their claim to a portion h ∈ [0, 1] of their resources.
The remaining resources are then split equally between the occupants of a ver-
tex. If a player raids, they lose all of their home resources to raiders unless no
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other player raids their home vertex, in which case they keep all of their home
resources.
Specifically, if f(v) = v (a player Iv chooses to defend), that player will
receive
Pv(f) = h+
(1− h)
|f−1(v)|
(1)
where |f−1(v)| denotes the cardinality of the preimage of f , and thus the total
number of players at vertex v. If f(v) = v′ 6= v (a player Iv chooses to raid
node v′), then the payoff is
Pv(f) =


1 + 1−h|f−1(v′)| if f
−1(v) = ∅, f(v′) = v′ (no player raids v and Iv′ defends)
1 + 1|f−1(v′)| if f
−1(v) = ∅, f(v′) 6= v′ (no player raids v and Iv′ raids)
1−h
|f−1(v′)| if f
−1(v) 6= ∅, f(v′) = v′ (some player raids v and Iv′ defends)
1
|f−1(v′)| if f
−1(v) 6= ∅, f(v′) 6= v′ (some player raids v and Iv′ raids)
(2)
We note that in order for a strict Nash equilibrium to exist, we must have
h < 1. Indeed, for a contradiction, assume h = 1 and that the Nash equilibrium
is generated by f : V → V . If f(v) = v for all v ∈ V , then any individual
can raid a neighbor and its payoff stays the same. If there is v ∈ V such that
f(v) 6= v, then individual Iv can stay home, receive the payoff of 1, and thus
not reduce its payoff.
The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. A simple, finite, undirected, and connected graph G admits
a derangement if and only if a Territorial Raider game played on G , with
h ∈ [0, 1), has a strict Nash equilibrium strategy set.
3. Proof of Theorem 2.1
We will first show that any derangement generates a strict Nash equilibrium
(Proposition 3.1). Then, we will show that any strict Nash equilibrium must be
generated by a derangement (Theorem 3.3). Theorem 2.1 follows directly from
these two results.
Proposition 3.1. If h ∈ [0, 1), then any a derangement f of G generates a
strict Nash equilibrium of the territorial raider game on G.
Proof. Under the definition of a derangement, a player Iv moved to f(v) 6= v,
Iv is the only occupant of f(v), and the vertex v is itself raided by player
If−1(v). The current payoff to player Iv is therefore 1. So, if player Iv changes
its strategy to defend, it will receive h+ 1−h2 < 1 instead of the current payoff of
1. If the player Iv decides to raid a different vertex w (which is already raided
by If−1(w)), it will receive a payoff of
1
2 < 1. Consequently, f generates a strict
Nash equilibrium.
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In order to simplify the proof of Theorem 3.3, we will first prove the following
Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.2. If f : V → V generates a strict Nash equilibrium, then we cannot
have all three of the following conditions satisfied:
1. f(v) = w 6= v (Iv raids w),
2. |f−1(w)| > 1 (there is another player on w; either Iw or another raider),
and
3. |f−1(v)| ≤ 1, (the vertex v itself is raided by at most one individual).
Proof. Under assumptions (1) and (2), the payoff to individual Iv is no more
than 12 . If only one player raids v and Iv changes its strategy to stay home,
the payoff for Iv will be h+
1−h
2 ≥
1
2 . Thus f does not generate a strict Nash
equilibrium.
If v is not raided by any player, then the player Iw can receive the payoff of 1
(the maximal payoff in this game) by raiding v (note that Iv raided w and so v
and w are connected). Again, f does not generate a strict Nash equilibria.
Now, we can prove the second implication in Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 3.3. For any h ∈ [0, 1), every strict Nash equilibrium of the Terri-
torial Raider game on G is generated by a derangement of G.
Proof. Let f : V → V be a function that generates a strict Nash equilibrium.
First, let us show that f must be injective. For a contradiction, let there be
v0 ∈ V such that |f−1(v0)| > 1. Set H0 = {v0} and let H1 = f−1(v0) \ {v0} be
the set of home vertices of the raiders of v0. Note that |H1| ≥ 1 andH0∩H1 = ∅.
By Lemma 3.2, as f generates a strict Nash equilibrium and satisfies conditions
(1) and (2), condition (3) cannot be satisfied. Thus, each vertex from H1 must
be raided by at least two individuals. SetH2 = f
−1(H1)\{v0}. Since individuals
from H1 raid v0 (and thus do not stay at their home vertices), H1 ∩ H2 = ∅.
Therefore, the sets {Hi}
2
i=0 are pairwise disjoint. Again, by Lemma 3.2, |H2| ≥
2|H1|−1 ≥ 1. By induction, once Hk is given, we can set Hk+1 = f−1(Hk)\{v0}
to get a sequence of pairwise disjoint sets {Hi}∞i=0 such that each vertex in Hk
is raided by individuals from Hk+1, and by Lemma 3.2, |Hk+1| ≥ 2|Hk|−1 ≥ 1.
Such a sequence of sets is impossible in a finite graph and thus we have a
contradiction with our assumption that f is not injective.
Now, assume that f is injective but that there is v ∈ V such that f(v) = v.
Since f is injective, no player raids v and thus Iv would improve its payoff
by raiding any of its neighboring vertices. This is a contradiction with the
assumption that f generates a strict Nash equilibrium.
Note that since any derangement of G = (V,E) is a bijective function f
with f(v) 6= v for all v ∈ V , there are at most
[
|V |!
e
]
such derangements (and
consequently at most
[
|V |!
e
]
strict equilibria of the Territorial Raider game on
G), where [·] indicates the nearest integer function [9]. The upper bound is
attained for a complete graph.
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